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The at-will doctrine permits employers to terminate employees at any time for
any reason—or no reason at all—so long as it is not an illegal one. This creates a
significant power imbalance between employers and employees, chills employee speech
regarding unsafe or unlawful workplace conduct, and leaves employees vulnerable to
arbitrary and unjust dismissals. The current system disproportionately impacts Black,
Latinx, and women workers, who are often segregated into low-wage jobs where the
at-will presumption applies. As evidenced by recent legislative eﬀorts around the
country, and especially in light of COVID-19, there is growing momentum in states
and localities to replace the at-will doctrine with a just cause standard. By contrast,
a just cause standard requires employers to articulate a bona fide reason for dismissal,
use a system of progressive discipline, and provide written notice to employees. Not
only is the just cause standard consistent with due process principles of adequate notice
and fair process, it also seeks to address racial and gender inequities in the workplace
and beyond.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, state law generally governs the formation of
employment relationships.1 In every state except Montana, employment
relationships are presumed to be “at-will.”2 This presumption of at-will
employment allows private3 employers to terminate employees at any time,
1 See Reuel L. Schiller, Regulating the Workplace: Three Models of Labor and Employment Law in
the United States, 29 NIHON U. COMP. L. 1, 1-2 (2012) (explaining that the creation of employment
relationships is governed by state common law or contract law, although a growing body of state,
federal, and local laws regulate employment relationships more generally). Under our system of
federalism, states and localities act as laboratories of democracy to further regulate employment,
ﬁlling in gaps where federal law is silent or codifying additional protections above the federal ﬂoor.
Cf. Paul M. Secunda & Jeﬀrey M. Hirsch, Debate, Workplace Federalism, 157 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
28, 28 (2008) (debating the merits of “whether the federal government or states are best equipped
to protect the rights of workers under the law”).
2 At-Will Employment Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 15, 2008)
[hereinafter NCSL, At-Will Overview], https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/atwill-employment-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/633K-UFA2].
3 Federal and state employees are generally not considered “at-will.” Rather, they can only be
fired for cause and are entitled to due process protections under the 5th and 14th Amendments.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511–13 (creating a for-cause standard for adverse employment actions, including
removal, against federal civil service employees); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (holding
that a state-employed teacher had a due-process-protected interest in continued employment);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (holding that a state statute outlining forcause removal provision and creating a property interest in continued employment for a civil servant
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for any reason, or no particular reason, so long as it is not an illegal one—
such as discrimination based on one’s membership in a protected class.4
Likewise, employees are free to quit at any time.5 While the at-will
presumption may be modiﬁed by contract6 or certain common law
exceptions,7 the at-will doctrine impacts the vast majority of workers
throughout the country.8
The at-will doctrine creates a signiﬁcant power imbalance in employment
relationships that favors employers. The current at-will system provides no
procedural safeguards and leaves employees vulnerable to arbitrary and unfair
dismissals and discipline. This is particularly true for Black and Latinx
workers and women,9 who are often segregated into low-wage jobs where the
at-will standard applies.10
Altering the employment landscape with wrongful discharge laws,11 or
creating a just cause employment standard, would tip the scales in favor of
workers by requiring employers to provide a bona ﬁde reason for dismissals.
As evidenced by recent legislation in Philadelphia, New York City, and
Illinois, there is growing momentum around the country to replace the at-

requires due process in removal proceedings); see also SUSAN TSUI GRUNDMANN, U.S. MERIT SYS.
PROT. BD., WHAT IS DUE PROCESS IN FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYMENT? (2015),
https://www.mspb.gov/studies/studies/What_is_Due_Process_in_Federal_Civil_Service_Employment
_1166935.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL34-CJV5] (discussing the history of for cause protection in the
federal civil service).
4 See NCSL, At-Will Overview, supra note 2.
5 Id.
6 For example, high-level employees at private companies frequently negotiate just cause
provisions into their individual employment agreements. See NCSL, At-Will Overview, supra note
2. Collective bargaining agreements in unionized workplaces often have just cause provisions for
discipline or termination. Id. However, in 2021, only 10.3% of U.S. workers were union members,
including less than 6.1% of private sector employees. Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat.,
Union Members—2021, at 1 (Jan. 20, 2022), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y379-T76N].
7 Three common law exceptions to the at-will doctrine include public policy, implied contract,
and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See NCSL, At-Will Overview, supra note 2.
8 See discussion supra note 3; see also Joyce Smithey, Can You Terminate an Employee Solely for
Poor Performance?, SMITHEY L. GRP. (Jan. 25, 2021), https://smitheylaw.com/can-you-terminate-anemployee-solely-for-poor-performance [https://perma.cc/X3VQ-XJ2E] (“[A]bout 74% of the US
workforce falls under the category of at-will employees.”).
9 Although the examples in this Essay predominantly focus on Black and Latinx workers, these
are not the only groups impacted by the at-will system. Thus, it is important to consider how this
system negatively aﬀects other workers of color and members of marginalized communities,
including women, immigrants, and folks with disabilities. See MARTHA ROSS & NICOLE BATEMAN,
BROOKINGS INST., METRO. POL’Y PROGRAM, MEET THE LOW-WAGE WORKFORCE 9 (2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/201911_Brookings-Metro_low-wageworkforce_Ross-Bateman.pdf [https://perma.cc/T77W-UHZ9].
10 See discussion infra Section I.B.
11 This Essay uses the terms “wrongful discharge laws” and “just cause laws” interchangeably.

2022]

Just Cause, Not Just Because

93

will doctrine with a just cause standard to provide employees with adequate
notice and fair process.12
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the origins of the atwill employment standard in the United States and how the current system
perpetuates racial and gender inequities in the workplace and beyond. Part II
outlines the hallmarks of just cause laws and explains how these provisions
are rooted in due process principles and equity. Part III discusses current and
pending just cause laws to serve as models for future legislation. Lastly, Part IV
urges the adoption of just cause laws at the federal or state level to replace
the current at-will system.
I. AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT AND RACIAL JUSTICE
A. The Origins of At-Will Employment in the United States
The at-will employment doctrine was born “out of slavery’s soil.”13
Following the abolition of slavery in 1865,14 employers sought new ways to
exert power and control over formerly enslaved Black people and immigrant
laborers.15 Railroad companies, which previously relied heavily on systems of
forced labor, were some of the sharpest critics of the Thirteenth Amendment
and Reconstruction-era eﬀorts to empower workers.16 Proponents of the atwill standard couched their argument in a perverse reading of the Thirteenth
Amendment: if forced labor is unconstitutional, and thereby employees have
a right to quit at any time for any reason, employers should also have a
mirrored right to terminate employees at any time for any reason.17 As labor

See infra Parts III, IV.
Rebecca Dixon, Hear Us: Cities are Working to End Another Legacy of Slavery—‘At-Will’
Employment, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (Oct. 19, 2021), https://www.nelp.org/press-clips/cities-areworking-to-end-another-legacy-of-slavery-at-will-employment [https://perma.cc/PS8U-6PKU]; see also
IRENE TUNG, PAUL SONN & JARED ODESKY, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, ‘JUST CAUSE’ JOB
PROTECTIONS: BUILDING RACIAL EQUITY AND SHIFTING THE POWER BALANCE BETWEEN
WORKERS AND EMPLOYERS 29-30 (2021), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Just-CauseJob-Protections-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ4P-MLYP] (noting that the at-will doctrine arose in
the aftermath of Reconstruction).
14 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
15 Dixon, supra note 13.
16 Id.; TUNG ET AL., supra note 13, at 29-30 (addressing railroad companies’ postReconstruction attempts to increase their power over workers).
17 Dixon, supra note 13. As legal historian Lea VanderVelde notes, this “mirrored right”
argument advanced by employers and proponents of the at-will doctrine is contrary to the intent of
the Reconstruction Congress:
12
13

In recent decades, it has become routine to claim that the at-will doctrine is justiﬁed
because the employee gains the right to quit employment in mutual exchange for
suﬀering the employer’s right to ﬁre him at will. The Reconstruction Congress did
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uprisings persisted in the decades following Reconstruction, conservative
jurists solidiﬁed the at-will doctrine in American jurisprudence.18
The United States is an anomaly compared to other wealthy, industrialized
countries.19 Throughout the twentieth century, industrialized nations across
the globe, including France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain,
and the United Kingdom, adopted legislation to protect workers against unjust
dismissals.20 Yet, the at-will stronghold remains in the United States.
B. The At-Will Doctrine Perpetuates Racial and Gender Inequities
The at-will system, where workers face the threat of abrupt termination,
has devastating eﬀects on individuals and families, chills employees’ speech
about unfair or discriminatory treatment, and leads them to accept dangerous

not see it that way: the right to quit was fundamental and constitutionally
guaranteed. . . .
Throughout [congressional discussions during Reconstruction], no one
articulated that this anti-subordinating constitutional protection—the right to quit—
entailed a reciprocal right permitting masters the freedom to discharge workers at
will. . . . Yet, a mere decade later, the concept that these two rights were connected
was used to bootstrap vulnerable workers’ fundamental constitutional rights into a
claim that the employer could ﬁre employees at will. The employer’s unrestrained
ability to ﬁre employees emerged as a quid pro quo for the employee’s right to quit in
the announcement of the at-will rule.
Lea VanderVelde, The Anti-Republican Origins of the At-Will Doctrine, 60 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 397,
409, 416-17 (2020) (footnotes omitted).
18 Dixon, supra note 13.
19 TUNG ET AL., supra note 13, at 1.
20 Id. (citing Mariya Aleksynska & Alexandra Schmidt, A Chronology of Employment Protection
Legislation in Some Selected European Countries 7 (Int’l Labour Org., Conditions of Work & Emp.
Series No. 53, 2014), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---travail/
documents/publication/wcms_324647.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2WF-83EC]); Lorenz Mayr & Jon
Heinrich, Termination of Employment Under German Law, MAYR KANZLEI FÜR ARBEITSRECHT,
https://www.mayr-arbeitsrecht.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Dismissal-WhitePaper-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H5WD-83EN] (discussing Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] §§ 622
and 626, which require notice and termination in writing, and the Protection Against Unfair
Dismissals Act of 1951, which outlines socially justiﬁable reasons for dismissals); Kazou Sugeno &
Keiichi Yamakoshi, Dismissals in Japan, Part One: How Strict Is Japanese Law on Employers?, 11 JAPAN
LAB. REV. 83, 84 (2014) (discussing post–World War II labor reform and the Supreme Court of
Japan’s interpretation “that a dismissal should be considered null and void as an abuse of right
without objective and appropriate reasons”). In the early twentieth century, European countries
began regulating prohibited reasons for dismissal, including military service, pregnancy, illness, or
accident. See Aleksynska & Schmidt, supra, at 9. In 1969, Portugal adopted a just cause law which
permitted employers to terminate employees who failed to fulﬁl their job responsibilities, repeatedly
violated workplace health and safety regulations, or willfully violated the employer’s property
interest, among other reasons. Id. In 1973, France “enacted a provision on the necessity of true and
serious grounds (causes réelles et sérieuses)” that required an employer to inform the employee of the
basis of their dismissal in writing or orally during a termination meeting if the employee asked. Id.
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working conditions or lower wages. Each of these concerns disproportionately
impacts women, workers of color, and other marginalized groups.
The labor market in the United States remains highly racially segregated.21
White and Asian people are concentrated in high-wage jobs, whereas Black and
Latinx people are concentrated in low-wage and service jobs.22 Therefore, as a
baseline, the at-will system has the most direct impact on Black and Latinx workers.
This system has both external eﬀects on workers’ livelihoods, and internal
eﬀects on workers’ on-the-job experiences.
Externally, ﬁrst, Black and Latinx workers are more likely to experience
unjust dismissals: 50% of Black workers and 52% of Latinx workers
responding to a 2019 Data for Progress survey reported being fired “for a bad
reason or no reason at all,” compared to 45% of white workers.23
Second, abrupt terminations have immediate ﬁnancial consequences for
individuals and their families in low-wage jobs who live paycheck to paycheck.
For example, Black and Latinx individuals are more likely to experience
extended periods of unemployment after a job separation, which contributes
to further job instability.24 From 2010 to 2019, 5.8% of Black workers and 5.3%
of Latinx workers experienced steady unemployment for at least three
months following a job separation, compared to 4.4% of their white
counterparts.25 This racial gap is exacerbated during periods of economic
recession: 7.1% of Black workers and 6.8% for Latinx workers, compared to
5.2% of white workers, experienced at least three months of unemployment
during the recession period of 2007 to 2009.26 Furthermore, Black and Latinx
people have signiﬁcantly less intergenerational wealth than their white
counterparts to fall back on during periods of unemployment, which
exacerbates the ﬁnancial hardships resulting from sudden job loss.27
21 BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., REP. 1088, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND
ETHNICITY, 2019 (2020), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-ethnicity/2019/home.htm
[https://perma.cc/P7E3-DC26].
22 See id.; TUNG ET AL., supra note 13, at 6 (noting that Black and Latinx workers are “most
often segregated in dangerous and lower-paying jobs”).
23 KATE ANDRIAS & ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, ROOSEVELT INST., ENDING AT-WILL
EMPLOYMENT: A GUIDE FOR JUST CAUSE REFORM 9 tbl.1 (2021), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/01/RI_AtWill_Report_202101.pdf [https://perma.cc/MYE3-K5MP].
24 See TUNG ET AL., supra note 13, at 4; see also Gillian B. White, Black Workers Really Do Need to Be
Twice as Good, ATLANTIC (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/whyblack-workers-really-do-need-to-be-twice-as-good/409276/ [https://perma.cc/6EBP-R4PD] (discussing
the racial gap in unemployment rates and its long-term eﬀects on job performance).
25 See TUNG ET AL., supra note 13, at 4.
26 Id.
27 See Kriston McIntosh, Emily Moss, Ryan Nunn & Jay Shambaugh, Examining the Black–White
Wealth Gap, BROOKINGS INST: UP FRONT BLOG (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2020/02/27/examining-the-black-white-wealth-gap [https://perma.cc/36XJ-6JWY]; TUNG ET. AL.,
supra note 13, at 4; see also Trymaine Lee, Inheritance, in THE 1619 PROJECT, 293, 293-305 (Nikole

96

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online

[Vol. 170: 90

Third, the sudden loss of income associated with abrupt terminations has
devastating downstream eﬀects for individuals and families and perpetuates
societal inequities. Folks may struggle to make rent or mortgage payments,
and as a result, risk losing housing.28 Parents may lose access to aﬀordable
childcare.29 Loss of income and other means of support can also drive
individuals to drop out of school.30 Each of these downstream eﬀects create
additional barriers to career advancement and perpetuate the cycle of racial
and gender inequities in the labor force.31 Thus, the external eﬀects stemming
from abrupt dismissals demonstrate how the at-will system grants employers
signiﬁcant power over workers’ livelihoods beyond the workplace.
Aside from the external eﬀects described above, the at-will system has
internal effects on workers’ on-the-job experiences. Fear of abrupt
dismissal or other forms of retaliation creates a chilling effect, whereby
workers are afraid to speak up against unsafe working conditions, workplace
discrimination, or other illegal conduct that they experience or witness.32
Although federal and state whistleblower laws are intended to protect
employees who speak up against illegal workplace conduct, these protections
are relatively narrow and hinge on employees’ willingness to come forward.33
Consider an all too prevalent phenomenon—sexual harassment in the
workplace. Studies suggest that over one quarter of women experience
workplace sexual harassment in their lifetimes.34 Sexual harassment is most
prevalent in occupational settings where employees work for tips (such as
accommodation and food services), are isolated from others (such as domestic
workers), in fields dominated by undocumented workers or those with
temporary visas (such as agriculture, domestic labor, and factory work), and
in male-dominated industries.35 Just Recovery’s October 2020 nationally
Hannah-Jones, Caitlin Roper, Ilena Silverman & Jake Silverstein eds., 2021) (discussing the
historical underpinnings of the racial wealth gap).
28 See TUNG ET AL., supra note 13, at 3.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See id.
32 See id. at 14-18.
33 See id. at 17 (discussing how current whistleblower statutes are too narrow and inadequately
deter employers from retaliation); Jawad Khan, Imran Saeed, Muhammad Zada, Amna Ali,
Nicolás Contreras-Barraza, Guido Salazar-Sepúlveda & Alejandro Vega-Muñoz, Examining the
Whistleblowing Intention: The Influence of Rationalization of Wrongdoing and Threat of Retaliation, 19
INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH no. 3, Feb. 2022, at 1, 13-14 (2022) (discussing psychological
factors impacting the decision to blow the whistle, including the perceived threat of retaliation).
34 ELYSE SHAW, ARIANE HEGEWISCH & CYNTHIA HESS, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y
RSCH., SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT AT WORK: UNDERSTANDING THE COSTS 1 (2018),
https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/IWPR-sexual-harassment-brief_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S3LW-A3JN].
35 Id. at 2-3; see also Chart of Risk Factors for Harassment and Responsive Strategies, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/chart-risk-factors-harassment-and-responsive-strategies
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representative survey results indicated that 31% of women “say that fear of
retaliation might prevent them from reporting workplace sexual
harassment.”36 Furthermore, 53% of workers across the gender spectrum who
previously experienced workplace sexual harassment responded that fear of
retaliation would factor into their decision to report.37
Moreover, workers fear retaliation for raising concerns about workplace
health and safety, especially in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The
October 2020 Just Recovery survey found that fear of retaliation would
prevent 22% of workers from raising concerns or refusing to work under
unsafe conditions.38 Of those, Black and Latinx workers reported higher rates
of concern about retaliation: 34% of Black workers and 25% of Latinx workers
feared retaliation, compared to 19% of white workers.39 These trends hold true
when focusing on COVID-19 related risks. A May 2020 nationwide survey
conducted by the National Employment Law Project found that Black
workers were twice as likely as white workers to experience or witness
retaliation from their employer for raising concerns about the spread of
COVID-19 in the workplace.40 Furthermore, 38% of workers reported going
to work despite feeling unsafe, out of fear of being penalized if they did not
show up.41 These rates are higher among Black and Latinx employees: 73% of
Black workers and 64% of Latinx workers reported going “to work even
though they believed they may have been seriously risking their health or the
health of a family member[,]” compared to 49% of white workers.42
As these examples illustrate, the at-will system creates a culture of fear
whereby employees continue to labor under unsafe, and often illegal,
workplace conditions and conduct. This perpetuates racial and gender inequities
in the workplace, as Black, Latinx, and poor immigrant—and particularly
[https://perma.cc/T95F-U53N] (listing twelve risk factors for workplace sexual harassment);
ALEXANDRA BRODSKY, SEXUAL JUSTICE: SUPPORTING VICTIMS, ENSURING DUE PROCESS,
AND RESISTING THE CONSERVATIVE BACKLASH 64-67 (2021) (discussing sexual harassment and
retaliation in the fast food, agricultural, and informal industries, such as domestic work).
36 TUNG ET AL., supra note 13, at 15; see also RAKEEN MABUD, AMITY PAYE, MAYA PINTO & SANJAY
PINTO, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJ., FOUNDATIONS FOR A JUST AND INCLUSIVE RECOVERY: ECONOMIC
SECURITY, HEALTH AND SAFETY, AND AGENCY AND VOICE IN THE COVID-19 ERA 22-27 (2021),
https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/Foundations-for-Just-Inclusive-Recovery-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2W7A-RRMV] (describing how, especially in the COVID-19 era, workers who
speak out against unsafe work conditions fear retaliation from their employers).
37 TUNG ET AL., supra note 13, at 15.
38 MABUD ET AL., supra note 36, at 23; TUNG ET AL., supra note 13, at 16.
39 MABUD ET AL., supra note 36, at 23; TUNG ET AL., supra note 13, at 16.
40 TUNG ET AL., supra note 13, at 14 (citing IRENE TUNG & LAURA PADIN, SILENCED ABOUT
COVID-19 IN THE WORKPLACE, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT 2 (2020), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wpcontent/uploads/Silenced-About-COVID-19-Workplace-Fear-Retaliation-June-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FH2J-QFU9]).
41 TUNG & PADIN, supra note 40, at 3.
42 Id.
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women43—workers are segregated into low-wage industries where these
conditions are most prevalent, and often go unchallenged. Of course, just
cause laws alone will not solve all the weaknesses with current whistleblower
laws.44 However, instituting a just cause standard is a step in the right
direction because it would give employees a greater sense of security to come
forward without fear of retaliation.45 Indeed, one in ﬁve workers—and one in
three Black workers—have indicated that stronger legal protections against
retaliation would empower them to speak up about unsafe or unlawful
workplace conditions.46 In sum, no employer should have this much power
over individuals, and these examples speak to a pressing need to reform the
employment landscape to provide greater protections for employees.
II. THE HALLMARKS OF JUST CAUSE LAWS
This Part explores the hallmarks of just cause laws, including the
deﬁnition of just cause, the progressive discipline system, and the writing
requirement for reasons for termination.
A. Defining “Just Cause”
Unlike an at-will employment relationship—which requires no cause or
reason for termination—a just cause relationship requires the employer to
have and articulate a good reason for termination. Just cause to terminate an
employment relationship typically falls into one of three categories: (1)
failure to satisfactorily perform one’s job duties or comply with an employer’s
policies, (2) egregious misconduct, or (3) a bona ﬁde economic reason.
1. Failure to Satisfactorily Perform Job Duties or Comply with Policy
To ensure an objective inquiry, state and local laws outline several
factors that a factfinder must consider when evaluating whether an

43 See ANNE MORRISON & KATHERINE GALLAGHER ROBBINS, NAT’L WOMEN’S L.
CTR., WOMEN’S OVERREPRESENTATION IN LOW-WAGE JOBS (2015), https://nwlc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/08/chartbook_womens_overrepresentation_in_low-wage_jobs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2WEF-ZN2Y] (noting that two-thirds of low-wage workers are women, and
women of color are overrepresented in this category).
44 A thorough discussion and analysis about the current gaps in the federal and state
whistleblower and anti-retaliation provisions is beyond the scope of this article. For some research
on why whistleblowers face up-hill legal battles, see Nancy M. Modesitt, Why Whistleblowers Lose:
An Empirical and Qualitative Analysis of State Court Cases, 62 KAN. L. REV. 165, 175-94 (2013).
45 Indeed, strengthening current whistleblower laws and passing just cause laws is crucial to
provide the most legal protection to employees. See TUNG ET AL., supra note 13, at 17-20 (advocating
for stronger whistleblower laws and just cause job protections).
46 TUNG & PADIN, supra note 40, at 4-5.
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employee’s failure to perform one’s job duties or comply with policy
constitutes just cause. These factors typically include (1) the employee’s
knowledge of their job duties or the employer’s policies, (2) whether the
employee received adequate and relevant training on those duties or
policies, (3) whether the employer’s policy is consistently and reasonably
applied to all employees, and (4) whether the employer undertook a fair and
objective investigation into the employee’s actions.47
These factors are rooted in due process principles and serve as an
accountability mechanism for both employers and employees. Consider the
ﬁrst two factors: the employee’s knowledge about duties and policies, and the
employer’s training on such duties and policies. An employer should make
their policies accessible to employees and provide sufficient on-the-job
training to new employees. Having clear policies and training allows
employees to understand not only their daily responsibilities, but also their
employer’s performance expectations. If an employee receives little to no
training regarding their job duties or is not given an employee handbook, can
an employer fault an employee for making a mistake or failing to comply with
policy? Under the at-will system, the legal answer is yes, because the system
grants employers signiﬁcant discretion to discipline and terminate employees
for even minor mistakes. In contrast, the just cause standard would grant extra
protection to employees if their employer fails to uphold their end of the
notice and training bargain.
Additionally, discrimination seeps into the workplace when an employer
does not apply their policies consistently to similarly situated employees.
For example, a policy may require a supervisor to give an employee a
warning or notice about performance deficiencies before placing them on a
performance improvement plan (PIP). If a supervisor immediately places
Latinx employees on PIPs without adequate notice, but routinely gives notice
to white employees, then the policy is inconsistently and unfairly applied.
Likewise, a supervisor might punish Black employees more frequently or
severely than white employees who engage in the same conduct.48 While
47 See H.R. 3530, 102d Gen. Assemb. § 10(b)(1)-(4) (Ill. 2021) (listing factors for determining
a just cause termination); PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-4703(1)(a)-(e) (2022) (outlining factors for
evaluating whether a parking employee has been discharged for just cause); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE § 20-1272(b)(1)-(5) (2021) (listing factors for assessing whether a fast-food employee has been
wrongfully discharged).
48 There is ample research documenting the racial gap in school discipline. See, e.g., Travis
Riddle & Stacey Sinclair, Racial Disparities in School-Based Disciplinary Actions Are Associated with
County-Level Rates of Racial Bias, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 8255 (2019) (stating that Black
students are much likelier to face harsher punishments, including more frequent suspension and
expulsion); Maithreyi Gopalan & Ashlyn Aiko Nelson, Understanding the Racial Discipline Gap in
Schools, 5 AM. EDUC. RSCH. ASS’N OPEN no. 2, 2019, at 1 (“Nationally, 5% of [w]hite boys and 2%
of [w]hite girls receive one or more out-of-school suspensions annually, as compared with 18% of
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federal and state antidiscrimination statutes ideally protect employees against
this behavior, plaintiﬀs face a high bar to show that an employer intentionally
discriminated against them on the basis of their membership in a protected
class.49 In reality, “many unfair employment actions where race [or other
protected characteristics] may be an element cannot realistically be
challenged under our civil rights laws.”50
2. Egregious Misconduct
Under some statutes, an employer has just cause to discipline or discharge
an employee who engages in “egregious misconduct.” One bill deﬁnes
egregious misconduct as “deliberate or grossly negligent conduct that
endangers the safety or well-being of the individual, co-workers, customers,
Black boys and 10% of Black girls and 7% of Hispanic boys and 3% of Hispanic girls.”). While there
is less research on the racial discipline gap in the workplace, the racial biases present in the school
setting can reasonably transcend into the workplace.
49 The above examples fall squarely under Title VII’s disparate treatment, rather than disparate
impact, provision. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting, among other things, discriminatory
treatment of an employee with respect to the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”
because of their “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”) with id. § 2000e-2(k) (requiring a
complaining employee to demonstrate that an employer’s practice causes a disparate impact).
Deviation from a neutral policy or practice is evidence of pretext in disparate treatment cases.
See, e.g., Vega v. Chi. Park Dist., 954 F.3d 996, 1004 (7th Cir. 2020) (“‘Signiﬁcant, unexplained or
systematic deviations from established policies or practices’ can be probative of discriminatory
intent.” (quoting Hanners v. Trent, 674 F.3d 683, 694 (7th Cir. 2012)); Brennan v. GTE Gov’t Sys.
Corp., 150 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Deviation from established policy or practice may be evidence
of pretext.”). Moreover, the use of subjective discretion to deviate from a neutral practice aligns with
an intentional discrimination theory. See Melissa Hart, Disparate Impact Discrimination: The Limits of
Litigation, the Possibilities for Internal Compliance, 33 J. COLL. & U.L. 547, 551 (2007) (“[V]ery few cases
have successfully challenged subjective practices on the disparate impact theory in lower courts.
Indeed . . . courts have been extremely resistant to recognizing the application of subjective judgment
as a ‘neutral’ employer policy.”); cf. E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1279-83 (11th Cir.
2000) (suggesting that longstanding, “neutral, albeit subjective” employment policies and practices that
result in discrimination comport with disparate treatment, rather than disparate impact, theory.).
Although Title VII permits plaintiﬀs to challenge facially neutral policies with discriminatory
eﬀects under a disparate impact theory, in practice, this theory is limited to scenarios such as written
examinations, seniority systems, and no-beard policies. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact
Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 705 (2006) (discussing how although courts have not
limited disparate impact cases to these scenarios, “the theory has proved an ill ﬁt to challenge”
practices aside from these historical examples). Furthermore, plaintiﬀs who bring disparate impact
claims have a low success rate. Id. at 738-39 (noting that, in six selected years between 1983 and 2002,
plaintiﬀs had a 25% success rate in district court and 19% success rate in appellate courts on a
disparate impact theory).
50 TUNG ET AL., supra note 13, at 12. For more information about the likelihood of
administrative or judicial relief in employment discrimination cases, see Maryam Jameel, Leslie
Shapiro & Joe Yeradi, More Than 1 Million Employment Discrimination Complaints Have Been Filed
with the Government Since 2010. Here’s What Happened to Them., WASH. POST. (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/business/discrimination-complaint-outcomes
[https://perma.cc/MF3T-SXX9].
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or other persons, including discrimination or harassment . . . or that causes
serious damage to the employer’s or customers’ property or business
interests.”51 While just cause laws generally require employers to use
progressive discipline for performance- or conduct-based terminations,52
employers may bypass this requirement in instances of egregious misconduct
to immediately rid their workforce of bad apples.53
3. Bona Fide Economic Reasons
Statutes generally deﬁne “bona ﬁde economic reason” as a full or partial
reduction in operations due to a reduction in supply, revenue, or proﬁt.54
Businesses can take a turn for the worse, and employers should not be
compelled to retain employees during times of economic hardship. However,
some statutes require employers to discharge employees in the reverse order
of seniority, when terminating on the basis of a bona ﬁde economic reason,
which further protects workers based on their length of service.55
B. Progressive Discipline
Existing and proposed wrongful discharge laws require employers to use
progressive discipline in order to support a just cause termination. One such
bill deﬁnes progressive discipline as:
An employer’s disciplinary system that provides a graduated range of
reasonable responses to an employee’s failure to satisfactorily perform his or
her job duties or comply with employer policies, with the disciplinary
measures ranging from mild to severe, depending on the frequency and
degree of the failure, and the employee being aﬀorded a reasonable period of
time to address concerns.56

H.R. 3530, 102d Gen. Assemb. § 5 (Ill. 2021).
See infra Part II.B.
See H.R. 3530, § 10(d) (“Under progressive discipline, an employer may discharge an
employee immediately for egregious misconduct.”); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-1272(c) (2021)
(carving out an exception to the prohibition on wrongful discharge when “termination is for an
egregious failure by the employee to perform their duties, or for egregious misconduct . . .”).
54 See H.R. 3530, § 10(e) (stating that a discharge is based on bona ﬁde economic reasons where
“the discharge results from a reduction in production, sales, services, proﬁt, or funding of the
employer . . .”); N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 20-1271 (deﬁning “bona ﬁde economic reason” as “the
full or partial closing of operations or technological or organizational changes to the business in
response to the reduction in volume of production, sales, or profit”); PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-4701(2)
(2022) (defining “bona fide economic reason” as “the full or partial closing of operations or
technological or organizational changes to the business, resulting in a reduction in revenue or profit”).
55 See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-1272(h); PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-4704(3).
56 H.R. 3530, § 5.
51
52
53
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Instituting a system of progressive discipline is a critical procedural aspect of
just cause laws. Progressive discipline provides adequate notice to the
employee about their deﬁcient performance and aﬀords them an opportunity
to seek guidance and feedback about the employer’s expectations. It also
provides a reasonable grace period for the employee to correct their
performance deﬁciencies. If the employee’s performance issues persist after
warnings and discipline, then the employer would be justiﬁed in terminating
the relationship and the employee will not be completely blindsided by the
termination.
C. The Writing Requirement
Just cause laws generally require employers to provide the reasons for the
employee’s termination in writing either at the time of discharge or soon
thereafter.57 While this is good practice under the at-will system, it is not
required. Further, under the just cause system, factﬁnders may only consider
the reasons proﬀered in the written explanation.58 Thus, this requirement
prevents the creation of post-hoc justiﬁcations for an employee’s termination
during litigation or arbitration.
III. EXAMPLES OF JUST CAUSE LAWS
This Part provides an overview of just cause statutes adopted in Montana,
Philadelphia, and New York City, as well as pending legislation in Illinois.59
The Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act is arguably the
most employer-friendly model. By contrast, Philadelphia, New York City,
and Illinois have taken a more progressive approach. The Philadelphia and
57 See N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 20-1272(d) (requiring a written explanation within ﬁve
days of termination); PHILA., PA., CODE §§ 9-4703(3), 4704(1) (requiring a prompt, written
explanation with precise reasoning); H.R. 35350, § 10(e)(3), (f) (requiring speciﬁc, written
explanation within three days of termination).
58 N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 20-1272(d) (barring a factﬁnder from considering reasons not
included in the written explanation); accord PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-4703(3); H.R. 35350, § 10(f).
59 In February 2021, Representative Mike Sylvester introduced a bill to end at-will employment
and adopt a just cause standard in Maine. An Act to End At-Will Employment, H.R. 398, L.D. 553,
130th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2021). On June 10, 2021, lawmakers in the House of Representatives voted
to reject the bill. See Caitlin Andrews, Maine Bill Aiming to End At-Will Employment Fails in House,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (June 10, 2021), https://bangordailynews.com/ 2021/06/10/politics/maine-bill-aimingto-end-at-will-employment-fails-in-house [https://perma.cc/QFX8-KK6K]. As an alternative, the House
narrowly passed a bill directing the Department of Labor and the Department of Economic and
Community Development to study the effects of ending at-will employment in the state. Id.;
H.R. 481, Comm. Amend. to L.D. 553, 130th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2021). However, the bill
died between houses on June 15, 2021. See Summary of LD 553, STATE OF ME. LEGISLATURE,
https://legislature.maine.gov/LawMakerWeb/summary.asp?paper=HP0398&SessionID=14
[https://perma.cc/S7UY-AKYA].
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New York City laws are limited in scope, as they only apply to workers in
speciﬁc occupations. The Secure Jobs Act, currently pending in the Illinois
state legislature, is the most pro-worker model in terms of its scope and
progressive provisions.
A. Montana: An Employer-Friendly Model
In July 1987, Montana became the ﬁrst—and currently, only—state in the
country to enact a just cause law.60 The state legislature recently amended the
statute to make it more employer-friendly, eﬀective April 2021.61 However,
there has been growing momentum in states and localities to adopt more
progressive just cause laws to protect workers, especially in light of the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Under the current version of the Montana Wrongful Discharge Act, a
discharge is unlawful if:
(a) [I]t was in retaliation for the employee’s refusal to violate public policy or
for reporting a violation of public policy;
(b) the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the
employer’s probationary period of employment; or
(c) the employer materially violated an express provision of its own written
personnel policy prior to the discharge, and the violation deprived the
employee of a fair and reasonable opportunity to remain in a position of
employment with the employer.62

The statute deﬁnes good cause as “any reasonable job-related grounds”
including “the employee’s failure to satisfactorily perform their job duties,”
“disruption of the employer’s operation,” and “material or repeated
violation[s]” of the employer’s express policies.63 In 2021, the legislature
expanded the definition of good cause to also include “other legitimate
business reasons determined by the employer while exercising the

60 Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, 1987 Mont. Laws 1764-67 (codiﬁed as amended
at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (2021)).
61 McKenzie McCarthy, Changes to the Montana Wrongful Discharge Act, MONT. ASS’N OF CNTYS.
(July 1, 2021), https://www.mtcounties.org/news/state-news/changes-to-the-montana-wrongful-discharge-act
[https://perma.cc/L7WN-PHPE].
62 § 39-2-904(1)(a)-(c). Under the original statute, a discharge was wrongful if the employer
simply violated its own personnel policy. § 39-2-904(3) (1987). Now, in light of the 2021 amendment,
the employer’s violation of its policy must be material and deprive the employee of a fair process.
Compare id. § 39-2-904(1)(c) (2011) with id. § 39-2-904(1)(c) (2021) (requiring a material violation of
a written personnel policy that deprived the employee of fair process).
63 MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5)(a)-(c) (2021).
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employer’s reasonable business judgment.”64 Thus, the amended language
grants employers signiﬁcantly broader discretion to terminate employees
than in prior years, but still requires the employer to articulate a reason.
B. Philadelphia and New York City: Occupation-Specific Models
Thanks to union lobbying eﬀorts, Philadelphia and New York City passed
progressive just cause legislation to protect employees in certain low-wage
occupations.65 In 2019, the Philadelphia City Council enacted the Wrongful
Discharge from Parking Employment Ordinance, which instituted a just
cause standard for parking employees.66 The law is estimated to provide
protections for nearly 1,000 employees throughout the city.67
In 2021, New York City enacted similar legislation aimed at the fast food
industry.68 The New York City law deﬁnes just cause as an “employee’s failure
to satisfactorily perform job duties or misconduct that is demonstrably and
materially harmful to the fast food employer’s legitimate business interests.”69
The law outlines several factors for determining just cause and requires
employers to use progressive discipline, except in instances of an employee’s
egregious misconduct or egregious failure to perform their job duties.70
Further, it stipulates that employers must conduct discharges based on bona
ﬁde economic reasons in order of reverse seniority.71
To be clear, these local laws are more progressive and pro-worker than
the Montana statute described above. However, the Philadelphia and New
York City laws are limited in coverage because they only apply to workers in
specific occupations—parking and fast food, respectively. This leaves other
nonunionized low-wage workers without adequate workplace protections.
Therefore, the best model in terms of its sweep and scope is the Illinois bill,
discussed below.
64 Compare id. § 39-2-903(5)(d) with id. § 39-2-903(5) (2011). See also McCarthy, supra note 61
(explaining that the 2021 amendments “give[] the employer more discretion on the decision to terminate”).
65 See Juliana Feliciano Reyes, City Council Approves ‘Just-Cause,’ a Cutting-Edge Worker Protection
Law, for the Parking Industry, PHILA. INQUIRER (May 16, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/justcause-firing-bill-philadelphia-parking-lot-workers-seiu-32bj-20190516.html [https://perma.cc/5UJMGSCV]; Mayor de Blasio Signs “Just Cause” Worker Protection Bills for Fast Food Employees, CITY OF
N.Y. (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www1.nyc.gov/oﬃce-of-the-mayor/news/005-21/mayor-de-blasio-signsjust-cause-worker-protection-bills-fast-food-employees [https://perma.cc/4FEL-9PDV].
66 PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-4700 (2022). The law deﬁnes parking employees as “any person
employed on the premises of a public parking garage, public parking lot, or for a valet parking
operator.” Id. § 9-4701(6).
67 Reyes, supra note 65.
68 Wrongful Discharge of Fast Food Employees, N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 20-1271-75 (2022).
69 Id. § 20-1271.
70 Id. § 20-1272(b)-(c).
71 Id. § 20-1272(h).
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C. Illinois: A Progressive, Pro-Worker Model
In February 2021, Illinois State Representative Carol Ammons and
Senator Celina Villanueva introduced the Illinois Employee Security Act,
also known as the Secure Jobs Act.72 Not only does this bill contain the
hallmarks of other just cause laws, including deﬁning just cause as the three
categories described in Section II.A,73 using a system of progressive discipline
as described in Section II.B,74 and requiring written reasons for the
termination as discussed in Section II.C,75 this bill provides greater
protections for employees in several respects.
First, in contrast to the Philadelphia and New York City laws, the Illinois
just cause bill would apply to most employers and employees in the state,
including local governments and school districts, while excluding federal and
state employees.76 Indeed, this expansive scope would fundamentally alter the
employment landscape in the state, providing protections to potentially
millions of workers.77
Second, in addition to the three standard categories of just cause,78 the
bill speciﬁes other conduct that does not constitute just cause. The bill
72 H.R. 3530, 102d Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2021); S. 2332, 102d Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2021). See David
Roeder, Labor Allies Target ‘At-Will’ Employment Rules, CHI. SUN TIMES (Mar. 31, 2021, 3:22 PM),
https://chicago.suntimes.com/business/2021/3/31/22360796/labor-allies-target-at-will-employment-rulessecure-jobs-act [https://perma.cc/N5NF-K2NH]. The bill is supported by several pro-worker
organizations and labor unions, including the Raise the Floor Alliance, SEIU Healthcare, and the
Chicago Teachers Union. Id. As of February 18, 2022, the bill has gone back to the Rules Committee after
being assigned to the House Labor & Commerce Committee. Bill Status of HB3530, ILL. GEN. ASSEMB.,
https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=3530&GAID=16&DocTypeID=HB&Ses
sionID=110&GA=102 [https://perma.cc/J52A-R5M9]. For a detailed report on how the Secure Jobs
Act would transform the employment landscape in Illinois, see UGO OKERE, KARA RODRIGUEZ, PAUL
SONN, IRENE TUNG & SOPHIA ZAMAN, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJ. & RAISE THE FLOOR ALL., SECURE
JOBS, SAFE WORKPLACES, AND STABLE COMMUNITIES: ENDING AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT IN
ILLINOIS (2021), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Secure-Jobs-Safe-Workplaces-StableCommunities-Ending-At-Will-Employment-Illinois.pdf [https://perma.cc/MV6B-2EHF].
73 H.R. 3530 § 5.
74 Id. § 10(c).
75 Id. § 10(f).
76 Id. § 5 (incorporating the definition of employee and employer from Illinois Wage Payment and
Collection Act, 820 ILL. CONS. STAT. 115/1 (2021), which excludes state and federal employees from its
definition). The law also does not apply to casual employees, defined as “employee[s] who perform[]
work in or around a private home that is irregular, uncertain, or incidental in nature and duration.” Id.
77 See Naomi Lopez Bauman, Labor-Union Membership in Illinois: Public vs. Private, ILL. POL’Y
(Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/labor-union-membership-in-illinois-public-vs-private
[https://perma.cc/55HB-XJEQ]. On average, between 2010 and 2014, approximately 4.6 million
public and private employees in Illinois did not belong to a union, and thus were potentially subject
to at-will employment. Id. Of course, this ﬁgure also includes employees potentially covered by
individual employment agreements containing just cause provisions. However, the precise number
of Illinois workers covered by these agreements is unclear.
78 H.R. 3530, § 5.

106

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online

[Vol. 170: 90

stipulates that “[j]ust cause may not be based on oﬀ-duty conduct unless there
is a demonstrable and material nexus between the conduct and the employee’s
job performance or the employer’s legitimate business interests.”79 This
language is key to protecting workers from retaliation based on oﬀ-premise
and oﬀ-duty conduct that their employer disagrees with or ﬁnds oﬀensive,
such as political expression or marijuana use.
For example, an individual may be motivated to express their views on
political and social issues by participating in public protests or posting on
social media in their spare time. Contrary to popular belief, the First
Amendment does not restrain private employers.80 Likewise, political
aﬃliation is not a protected class under federal antidiscrimination law,81 and
only a handful of states make it unlawful for employers to discriminate on the
basis of one’s political affiliation or political activities.82 Indeed, employers
have significant discretion to fire employees for off-duty speech, including
expressive conduct.
Some states, however, have statutes that prohibit employers from taking
adverse actions against employees for lawful, oﬀ-duty conduct.83 For example,
New York recently amended its law to prohibit adverse employment actions
based on an employee’s lawful, recreational marijuana use while oﬀ-duty and
oﬀ-premises.84 Presumably, under the Illinois bill, employers could still take
action against employees for oﬀ-duty, unlawful conduct, so long as there is a
“demonstrable and material nexus” to the employee’s job performance or the
employer’s business interest.85
Id. § 10(a).
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, . . . or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”).
81 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (protecting against employment discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin, but not political beliefs).
82 California, New York, and the District of Columbia laws protect against employment
discrimination on the basis of political affiliation or political activities. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1101–02
(West 2021); D.C. Human Rights Act, D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (2022); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d
(McKinney 2021). The New York law is relatively narrow, as it only deﬁnes “political activities” as
running for oﬃce, campaigning, or participating in fundraising activities. Id. § 201-d(1)(a).
83 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2022); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2)(b), (c).
84 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2)(b), (c); see also ADULT USE CANNABIS AND THE WORKPLACE: NEW
YORK LABOR LAW 201-D, N.Y. DEP’T OF LAB. (2021), https://dol.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2021/
10/p420-cannabisfaq-10-08-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BPW-3HUA] (describing the implications of
the recent amendment to the New York Labor Law).
85 H.R. 3530, 102d Gen. Assemb. § 10(a) (Ill. 2021). For example, employers would be
permitted to terminate employees who participated in the unlawful attempted insurrection at the
United States Capitol on January 6, 2021, so long as they can demonstrate a material nexus to their
business interests. Sarah J. Platt & Jimmy F. Robinson, Jr., Can Employers Fire Rioters? Employers’ Rights
in Policing Employee Off-Duty Conduct and Employment Law Consequences of the Capitol Riots, NAT’L L.
REV. (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/can-employers-fire-rioters-employersrights-policing-employee-duty-conduct-and [https://perma.cc/G9QG-QBLE].
79
80
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Further, drafted against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, the bill
provides additional protections relating to worker health and safety.
Speciﬁcally, the bill states that there is never just cause to terminate an
employee based on their communications about “workplace practices or
policies, including but not limited to health or safety practices or hazards
related to COVID-19” or “an employee’s refusal to work under conditions
that [they] reasonably believe[] would expose [themselves or others] to an
unreasonable health or safety risk, including, but not limited to, risk of illness
or exposure to COVID-19.”86 These are protected activities under the Act,
and employers cannot retaliate against employees for raising such concerns
or refusing to work on these bases.87 These provisions are not only grounded
in concerns about workplace safety and public health, but also in
whistleblower and free speech principles, so that citizens have access to
information about matters of public concern.88
Third, the bill provides employees protection against blacklisting.
Blacklisting occurs when an employer prevents or attempts to prevent a
former employee from obtaining employment with another employer
through verbal or written statements.89 Of course, employers are permitted
to provide truthful statements about a former employee’s discharge to a future
employer.90 Under common law, the typical recourse against blacklisting by a
former employer is through defamation or tortious interference with
contractual relationship claims.91 Lawsuits are expensive and time consuming,
so the anti-blacklisting provision is particularly beneﬁcial to low-wage
86 H.R. 3530 § 10(h)(1), (2). Section 10(h)(1), the whistleblower aspect of the law, includes a
broad range of recipients and mediums regarding workplace safety communications. Such
communications may be made to the employer, an agent, other employees, government agencies, or
members of the public, arguably including the media. Id. Furthermore, employees may blow the whistle
via print, online, social media, or other media, presumably including verbal communications. Id.
87 Id. § 10(h).
88 Cf. Ruth Ann Strickland, Whistleblowers, FIRST AMEND. ENCYC., https://www.mtsu.edu/ firstamendment/article/1029/whistleblowers [https://perma.cc/5JTF-GLK5] (stating that whistleblowers
“expose . . . illegal conduct that could aﬀect public safety,” among other things); Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 146-48 (1983) (establishing First Amendment test for public employee speech on
matters of public concern, in which courts must look to the “content, form, and context” of a
statement, and determine whether it “relat[es] to any matter of political, social, or other concern to
the community” to garner constitutional protection).
89 H.R. 3530, § 35.
90 Id.
91 See DAVID J. CARR, ED.-IN-CHIEF, NON-COMPETITION, TRADE SECRETS, PROPRIETARY
INFO., & DUTY OF LOYALTY SUBCOMM. OF THE EMP. RTS. & RESPS. COMM. OF THE AM. BAR
ASS’N LAB. & EMP. SECTION, BLACKLISTING: 2011, at 4 (2011), https://www.troutman.com/
images/content/4/4/v1/4446/Blacklisting_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/34AQ-A7DK] (“[P]laintiffs have
recovered against employers engaging in blacklisting by pursuing common law claims such as
defamation, slander, invasion of privacy, intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress, and tortious
interference with an employment relationship.”).
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workers who might not otherwise have the means to ﬁght an uphill legal
battle against Goliath.92
Finally, the bill provides for severance pay upon termination.93 An
employee would “accrue one hour of severance pay for every 12.5 hours
worked during [their] ﬁrst year of employment, and for every 50 hours
thereafter[,]” payable at employee’s hourly rate upon discharge.94 This is not
a new concept—high-level individual employment agreements often provide
severance pay.95 For low-wage workers in particular, guaranteed severance pay
could mitigate immediate ﬁnancial hardships, such as rent and childcare
payments, and provide a cushion during the search for new employment. As
discussed in Section I.B, Black and Latinx workers are more likely to
experience extended unemployment periods, and the racial wealth gap
impacts their ability to stay aﬂoat ﬁnancially during those periods.96 Thus,
guaranteed severance payments would help alleviate the ﬁnancial burdens
faced, particularly by Black and Latinx workers, in the wake of job loss.
IV. THE NEED FOR JUST CAUSE LEGISLATION
The recent legislative eﬀorts in Philadelphia (2019), New York City
(2021), and Illinois (2021) discussed above indicate there is growing
momentum to do away with the at-will standard and provide greater
employment protections to employees. Indeed, recent polling indicates there
is strong support for the adoption of just cause laws across party lines, income
levels, and geography: “71 percent of voters in battleground congressional
districts—including 67 percent of Republicans and 75 percent of Democrats—
expressed support” for such legislation.97 This trend holds true across income
brackets: 75% of workers with annual household income under $50,000, 70%
of workers with annual household income between $50,000 and $100,000, and
66% of workers with annual household income over $100,000 expressed
support for a just cause standard.98 Furthermore, “[t]hree out of four
suburban and rural likely voters favored just cause laws, as did 66 percent of

92 Thirty states have anti-blacklisting statutes on the books, though their scope, application,
and available remedies vary. See id. at 22 & n.7. Anti-blacklisting statutes can simply deter employers
from engaging in this behavior. To the extent the statutes do not deter, it is easier for plaintiﬀs to
state a claim for blacklisting than defamation because blacklisting claims do not require proof of
harm. See id. at 23.
93 H.R. 3530 § 15.
94 Id.
95 See TUNG ET AL., supra note 13, at 22.
96 See supra Section I.B.
97 TUNG ET AL., supra note 13, at 21.
98 Id.
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urban likely voters.”99 These data illustrate there is a broad coalition of
support for just cause legislation and the time is ripe to act.
There has been some discussion about just cause laws at the federal level.
During his 2020 presidential campaign, Senator Bernie Sanders called for a
national just cause law in his pro-worker platform.100 Other groups have urged
President Biden to adopt a just cause standard for federal contractors via
Executive Order.101
Indeed, Congress can pass a just cause statute pursuant its powers under
the Commerce Clause.102 The obvious advantage to a federal law is
uniformity, as the same standard would apply to all covered employers and
employees, regardless of geographic location. However, a federal law might
fail for two reasons. First, despite the broad support described above, a
federal bill is politically unlikely. Even if legislators introduced and passed a
bill in the currently Democrat-controlled House of Representatives, the bill
would likely die in the Senate, given its current partisan makeup and the
ﬁlibuster.103 Second, and more importantly, regulation of employment
99 Id.
100 Bryce
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101 Karla Walter & Anastasia Christman, Service Contract Workers Deserve Good Jobs, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 9, 2021, 5:30 AM), https://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/economy/
reports/2021/04/09/179997/service-contract-workers-deserve-good-jobs [https://perma.cc/7R65-ARST].
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate channels,
instrumentalities, and substantial eﬀects of interstate commerce. See Diane McGimsey, The
Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the JurisdictionalElement Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675, 1688-1701 (2002) (discussing the history of the three
prongs of the Commerce Clause test). Indeed, Congress has passed—and the Court has upheld—
several employment and labor laws pursuant to this power. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act against a Commerce
Clause challenge); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards
Act against a Commerce Clause challenge); Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.
§ 651(b) (noting the congressional basis for the Act is the commerce power); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 458 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“In my opinion the commerce power is broad
enough to support federal legislation regulating the terms and conditions of state employment, and
therefore, provides the necessary support for the 1972 Amendments to Title VII, even though
Congress expressly relied on § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (upholding the application of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act to state and local governments as a valid exercise of the commerce power);
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (noting the constitutional bases for the Act
are the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment).
103 Throughout history, Republicans have used the ﬁlibuster and cloture rule to delay or block
civil rights legislation, and this trend holds true today. See Tim Lau, The Filibuster, Explained,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/researchreports/ﬁlibuster-explained [https://perma.cc/LPM5-R6PD] (discussing the history and mechanics
of the ﬁlibuster); Sarah Binder, Mitch McConnell Is Wrong. Here’s the Filibuster’s ‘Racial History.’,
WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2021, 6:36 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/03/24/
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relationships is largely left to the states.104 More speciﬁcally, the at-will
presumption is a function of state common law, rather than federal statute.105
If Congress does not act, states can—and should. States should follow in
the footsteps of Montana, and hopefully Illinois, by passing just cause laws
that apply to their entire workforce. State legislators can refer to the statutes
described in Part III to craft legislation containing the hallmarks of a just
cause law—deﬁning just cause to include the three traditional categories,
mandating a system of progressive discipline, and requiring that employers
provide written explanations at the time of discharge.106 Moreover, legislators
should look to the Illinois Secure Jobs Act as a gold standard, progressive,
just cause law, because it provides the most protection to employees,
especially in light of COVID-19.107 As discussed throughout this Essay,
replacing the at-will doctrine with a just cause standard is grounded in due
process principles of adequate notice and fair process, and will address racial
and gender inequities in the labor force.
CONCLUSION
For far too long, the at-will doctrine has given employers signiﬁcant
power over employees’ livelihoods and wellbeing. It is time for the United
States to join other industrialized nations to provide its employees with
common sense protections against arbitrary and unfair dismissals. Though
this seems like a massive undertaking given the long history of at-will
employment in the United States, at bottom, the just cause standard simply

mitch-mcconnell-is-wrong-heres-ﬁlibusters-racial-history [https://perma.cc/4DQF-VJ2W] (“Of the
30 measures we identiﬁed between 1917 and 1994, exactly half addressed civil rights—including
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https://www.vox.com/2022/1/19/22881837/senate-ﬁlibuster-vote-voting-rights-joe-manchin-kyrstensinema [https://perma.cc/4FZC-H7D9] (discussing the recent ﬁlibuster of the Freedom to Vote Act
and John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act, as well the impact of the ﬁlibuster on other agenda
items including police reform, universal background checks for ﬁrearms purchases, and LGBTQ+
workplace protections).
There have been growing calls on the left to abolish the ﬁlibuster; however, Democrats failed
to garner necessary support to reform the Senate rules. See Caroline Fredrickson, The Case Against
the Filibuster, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/case-against-ﬁlibuster [https://perma.cc/99N2-ZR4L] (advocating for the
abolition of the ﬁlibuster); Zhou, supra (discussing Democrats’ failed attempt to change the ﬁlibuster
rules on voting rights legislation). In consideration of this current political reality, it is unlikely to
ﬁnd sixty votes to successfully pass a federal just cause law.
104 See discussion supra note 2.
105 See Schiller, supra note 1, at 2.
106 See supra Parts II, III.
107 H.R. 3530, 102d Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2021).
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requires employers to articulate a bona ﬁde reason for dismissal and provide
adequate notice and process to employees. Indeed, decent employers already
do these things. There is growing momentum, especially in light of the
COVID-19 pandemic, to replace the at-will system with a just cause standard
to put power back into the hands of employees and help address workplace
and societal inequities. As society continues to reckon with and address racial
inequities in 2022 and beyond, coalitions of grassroots advocates should come
together to urge state legislators across the country to adopt just cause laws
to provide increased protections for workers.

